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The Helsinki Water Convention:  
Implementation and Compliance in Asia
Simon Marsden*
Since 2013 it has been a global treaty,2 and in fo-
cusing on transboundary water cooperation, is 
applicable to Asian as well as other states.3 This 
is significant for the following reasons: first, Asia 
contains the largest number of transboundary 
watercourses and lakes; second, there is a need to 
ensure environmental protection, and equitable 
and reasonable use of them; third, the potential 
for conflict based on state sovereignty4 is high, 
and cooperation is therefore essential; fourth, the 
Helsinki Convention is the only international wa-
ter treaty with detailed substantive environmen-
tal provisions, and with a primary focus on envi-
ronmental protection5; and fifth, Asia has grow-
2 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and Lakes, The Global Opening of the 1992 
UNECE Water Convention (UNECE, 2013).
3 Ruby Moynihan and Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, ‘The Rising 
Role of Regional Approaches in International Water Law: 
Lessons from the UNECE Water Regime and Himalayan 
Asia for Strengthening Transboundary Water Coopera-
tion’ (2014) 23 Review of European, Comparative and Inter-
national Environmental Law 43.
4 See Julie Gjørtz Howden, ‘Aspects of Sovereignty and 
the Evolving Regimes of Transboundary Water Manage-
ment’ (2015) 1 Nordic Environmental Law Journal 47, who, 
while making no mention of the Helsinki Water Conven-
tion, comments: ‘…conflict and competition over quan-
tity and quality of water use will often occur between 
domestic groups or between transnational groups…’
5 For a comparison of the regimes with reference to 
China, see Patricia Wouters and Huiping Chen, ‘China’s 
‘Soft Path’ to Transboundary Water Cooperation Exam-
ined in the Light of Two UN Global Water Conventions 
– Exploring the ‘Chinese Way’’ (2014) 22 Water Law 229.
Abstract
In 2013 the Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes (‘the 
Helsinki Convention’) became a global treaty, and 
is now open to all states, including in Asia. This 
article reviews the application of the Helsinki Con-
vention in Asia, with a particular focus on imple-
mentation and compliance. This focus follows an 
outline of the main institutions and procedural pro-
visions, and experience derived from the first and 
second assessments of transboundary waters. The 
development of a regime within the Helsinki Con-
vention is needed because of the absence of formal 
reporting and compliance mechanisms, which are 
considered to be essential to modern multilateral 
environmental agreements.
I. Introduction
There are 41 Parties to the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Con-
vention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and Lakes (‘the Helsinki 
Convention’) which came into force on 6 October 
1996 after adoption in Helsinki on 17 March 1992.1 
* Professor, Flinders Law School, South Australia, simon.
marsden@flinders.edu.au 
1 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourses and Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992), 31 
ILM (1992) 1312, in force 6 October 1996. See Attila Tanzi, 
‘Regional Integration and the Protection of the Environ-
ment: The UNECE Process on Water Law as a Model for 
the Global Dimension’, in Tullio Scovazzi (ed) The Protec-
tion of the Environment in a Context of Regional Economic In-
tegration (Università degli studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2001).
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ing experience with both this treaty and other 
agreements for transboundary cooperation,6 with 
potential for increased membership. Scholarly in-
terest to date has, despite this, focused on the 1997 
United Nations Convention on International Wa-
tercourses (‘the New York Convention’), which 
has recently entered into force and has 36 Parties.7 
This article, with a focus on the Helsinki Con-
vention, is a modest contribution to address the 
imbalance.
The current Asian Parties to the Helsinki 
Convention are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is expected that 
other states will also join, including Georgia.8 Iran 
has furthermore expressed an interest,9 as has 
6 See for example Agreement on Cooperation for the Sus-
tainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (Chi-
ang Rai, 5 April 1995), unreported, in force 5 April 1995.
7 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of In-
ternational Watercourses (New York, 21 May 1997, by 
UNGA Res. 51/229), 36 ILM (1997) 700, in force 17 August 
2014. There are eight Asian Parties to the New York Con-
vention: Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq,  Qatar, 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The provisions of the Hel-
sinki Convention are more specific, with the exception 
of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization 
in the New York Convention. For differences between 
these regimes, see ‘The Global Opening’, above n 2, 9–10; 
UNECE, ‘How the Two Global Water Conventions Sup-
port Transboundary Water Cooperation’ – http://pro-
gramme.worldwaterweek.org/event/how-the-two-3637; 
and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
/ Attila Tanzi, The Economic Commission for Europe Water 
Convention and the United Nations Watercourses Convention: 
An analysis of their harmonized contribution to international 
water law (United Nations, 2015).
8 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe / 
OSCE Environment and Security Initiative, Draft Report of 
the National Working Group Meeting for Identification of the 
Legal and Institutional Needs for Accession and Implementa-
tion of the UNECE Water Convention by Georgia, Tbilisi, 26 
June 2009.
9 UNECE, ‘Iran discusses the benefits of the UNECE 
 Water Convention’, press release, 23 January 2013.
Iraq,10 and most recently, Lebanon,11 Jordan,12 
and Mongolia.13 There is hence a likely future 
overlap between the Parties to both the Helsinki 
and New York Conventions.14 As the potential 
for conflict, environmental harm and industrial 
accidents involving watercourses is high, the 
Helsinki Convention has the added advantage 
of inter-related linkages with the other UNECE 
treaties that address some of these issues.15 Asia 
has growing experience with both this treaty 
and these other agreements for transboundary 
cooperation, and there is clear potential for mem-
bership to increase further to avoid and resolve 
disagreements, pollution and accidents.16 
The objective of this article is to review the 
application of the Helsinki Convention in Asia, 
with a particular focus on implementation and 
compliance. This focus is appropriate because 
implementation and compliance is acknowl-
edged to be the weakest link in international en-
10 UNECE, ‘Iraq and Tunisia express interest in joining 
UNECE Water Convention’, press release, 16 October 
2013.
11 UNECE, ‘Lebanon to consider joining UNECE Water 
Convention following Beirut workshop’, press release, 
10 February 2015.
12 UNECE, ‘Jordan initiates study of the UNECE Water 
Convention’, press release, 17 March 2015.
13 UNECE, ‘New countries from outside the UNECE 
region express interest in the Water Convention’, tenth 
meeting of the Working Group on Integrated Water Re-
sources Management, Geneva, 24 and 25 June 2015.
14 Uzbekistan is however currently the only Party to 
both, with the Asian Parties to the Helsinki Convention 
primarily in central Asia and those to the New York Con-
vention in western Asia.
15 Simon Marsden and Elizabeth Brandon, Transboundary 
Environmental Governance in Asia: Practice and Prospects 
with the UNECE Environmental Agreements (Edward El-
gar, 2015).
16 In relation to China see for example, Patricia Wouters, 
‘The Yin and Yang of International Water Law: China’s 
Transboundary Water Practice and the Changing Con-
tours of State Sovereignty’ (2014) 23 Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law 67.
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vironmental law,17 and this is true also of Asia.18 
This article will firstly outline the main institu-
tions and explain the procedural provisions of 
the Helsinki Convention;19 it will secondly re-
view current implementation in Asia based on 
information received as part of the assessment 
of transboundary watercourses, and growing ca-
pacity building efforts; it will thirdly, and most 
significantly, consider the work of the Legal 
Board in the establishment of the Implementa-
tion Committee to deal with compliance and 
compliance issues; finally, some conclusions fol-
low at the end.
II. Institutions and procedures
The main institutions are the Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP), Bureau, Legal Board and Im-
plementation Committee, the latter which as a 
non-compliance procedure (NCP) is intended 
to avoid rather than settle disputes.20 The MOP 
is the main decision making body comprising 
17 See Carl Bruch and Elizabeth Mrema, Manual on Com-
pliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (UNEP, 2006).
18 Note for example the role of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the inability to resolve 
the haze pollution issue despite an international agree-
ment on the matter; see Koh, KL and Karim, MS, ‘South 
East Asian Environmental Legal Governance’ in Alam, 
S, Bhuigan, MJH, Choudhury and Techera, EJ, Routledge 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge, 
2013) 463.
19 The Convention also has two protocols, the Protocol 
on Water and Health, and the Protocol on Civil Liabili-
ty, neither of which is discussed here due to space con-
straints. The latter is shared with the UNECE Convention 
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 
(Helsinki, 17 March 1992) UNTS 2105 (1992) 457, in force 
19 April 2000.
20 See Tullio Treves, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara 
Ragni, and Laura Pineschi (eds) Non Compliance Proce-
dures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements (TMC Asser Press, 2009); Karen 
Scott, ‘Non-compliance Procedures and the Resolution 
of Disputes under International Environmental Agree-
ments’, in Duncan French and Nigel White (eds) Interna-
tional Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problems and Tech-
niques (Hart Publishing, 2010) 225.
all Parties, the Bureau develops the workplan, 
and the Legal Board has focused on the develop-
ment of authoritative guidance21 together with 
the formal compliance procedure administered 
by the Implementation Committee. There are 
also working groups on Integrated Water Re-
sources Management and Monitoring and As-
sessment, task forces on Water and Climate and 
Water-Food-Energy-Ecosystems Nexus, and a 
Joint ad-hoc Expert Group on Water and Indus-
trial Accidents.
While the Helsinki Convention establishes 
a general institutional structure to assist with 
implementation, compliance and further devel-
opment, realisation of these matters depends 
on bilateral and multilateral agreements being 
concluded between riparian states that share the 
resource and the establishment of joint bodies to 
administer them.22 An absence of specific report-
ing and compliance mechanisms in the treaty 
has, as will be seen below, led to the work of the 
Legal Board, Implementation Committee and 
others, in developing such mechanisms. Part I 
duties of the Helsinki Convention are the more 
general and apply to all Parties; Part II duties are 
more specific and must be implemented via fur-
ther agreements between the Riparian Parties; 
Part III provisions also apply to all Parties. 
In relation to Part I, Article 2 contains obliga-
tions to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent, 
21 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and Lakes, Guide to Implementing the Water 
Convention (United Nations, 2013) (Implementation Guide). 
22 There are some similarities with other joint bodies 
operating in other regions of the Asia Pacific. See for 
 example the role of the International Joint Commission in 
resolving issues of transboundary water and air pollution 
in North America; Jason Buhi and Lin Feng, ‘Honoring 
the International Joint Commision’s Role in the United 
States-Canada Transboundary Air Pollution Control 
Regime: A Century of Experience to Guide the Future’ 
(2009) 11 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 107.
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control and reduce any transboundary impact’,23 
including pollution ‘with the aim of ecologically 
sound and rational water management, conser-
vation of water resources and environmental 
protection.’ Article 4 requires the establishment 
of monitoring programmes for transboundary 
waters, primarily to collect baseline data rather 
than to evaluate the outcomes of approved de-
velopment proposals. Article 5 obliges coopera-
tion in research efforts by the Parties to develop 
effective techniques to prevent, control and re-
duce transboundary impact. Article 6 provides 
for the ‘widest exchange of information, as early 
as possible’ in relation to issues of concern.
In relation to Part II, Article 9, supplement-
ing Article 2(6) on cooperation in general, re-
quires the preparation of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements between them.24 Agreements 
are intended to include matters covered by the 
Helsinki Convention and other issues the Ripar-
ian Parties wish to include for the catchment 
area they specify within. Article 9(2) for example 
provides for the establishment of joint bodies 
between the Riparian Parties under the Helsinki 
Convention, one of the purposes of which (j) is 
‘to participate in the implementation of envi-
ronmental impact assessments relating to trans-
boundary waters, in accordance with appro-
23 This is the codification of the ‘no harm’ customary 
international law rule and is a due diligence obligation 
focused on what is appropriate and proportional to the 
degree of risk and harm; see Implementation Guide, above 
n 21, 19–21. This was a key part of the decision by the 
ICJ in Pulp Mills; see Timo Koivurova, ‘Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment in International Law’, 
in Simon Marsden and Timo Koivurova (eds) Trans-
boundary Environmental Impact Assessment in the European 
Union: The Espoo Convention and its Kiev Protocol on Strate-
gic Environmental Assessment (Routledge, 2011) 15, 23–25.
24 These can be located in the document: Economic Com-
mission for Europe Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, Second Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes 
and Groundwaters (United Nations, 2011) (Second Assess-
ment).
priate international regulations’.25 Because it is 
mandatory for such agreements to be prepared, 
this distinguishes ‘the Water Convention from 
other international instruments in the field and 
is considered to be the main added value of the 
Convention.’26
Other significant provisions in Part II in-
clude the Article 11 obligation which enables the 
collection of baseline data to evaluate practice, 
including ‘the effectiveness of measures taken for 
the prevention, control and reduction of trans-
boundary impact’ (Article 11(3)). The Working 
Group on Monitoring and Assessment has an im-
portant role in preparing periodic assessments of 
the status of transboundary waters, promoting 
the exchange of data on environmental condi-
tions, encouraging Parties to inform each other 
about critical situations with transboundary 
impact and verifying compliance with water-
quality objectives and permit conditions. These 
assessments, while a means of considering im-
plementation of Parties obligations under the 
Helsinki Convention, are not however the same 
as more formal reporting obligations required 
under other environmental treaties. They are a 
means of collecting baseline data rather than a 
way of demonstrating clear adherence to treaty 
obligations.
III. Implementation in Asia
Russia, Asia’s largest state, is an example of a 
 Riparian Party to have implemented the obliga-
tion to enter into agreements with under states 
under the Convention. Russia shares trans-
boundary waters with both Asian Parties (Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan) and Asian non-Parties 
25 This includes the Convention on Environmental Im-
pact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 25 
February 1991), 30 ILM (1991) 802, in force 27 June 1997. 
26 Other requirements to establish joint bodies and for 
institutional cooperation are also emphasized. See Imple-
mentation Guide, above n 21, 63–64.
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(China, North Korea, Georgia and Mongolia). 
In the 1990s it entered into bilateral agreements 
with Kazakhstan (1992, replaced by an agree-
ment in 2010), Mongolia (1995), China (2008) and 
Azerbaijan (2010). There is however no bilateral 
agreement between Russia and Georgia.
As three of the five current Parties are in 
central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
 Uzbekistan) and another is in Caucasia (Azer-
baijan) capacity building efforts to improve im-
plementation of the Convention and compliance 
with it in, and related to, these sub-regions are 
particularly significant.27 The UNECE notes that 
Phase II of the UNECE Programme, ‘Regional 
Dialogue and Cooperation on Water Resources 
Management in Central Asia’, aims to improve 
the capacity of the International Fund for Saving 
the Aral Sea (IFAS), including its organizations 
and institutions and to strengthen their legal 
 basis.28 
IFAS was established by all five central Asian 
States to implement in a coordinated way the 
practical measures and programmes to overcome 
the impacts of the Aral crises and to improve en-
vironmental and socioeconomic conditions in 
the Aral Sea Basin. The Interstate Commission 
on Sustainable Development is a body of the IFAS 
which is in charge of coordinating regional coop-
eration on environment and sustainable devel-
opment in central Asia. The UNECE also notes 
that the project is a component of the ‘Trans-
boundary Water Management in Central Asia’ 
programme, which is carried out on behalf of the 
German  Federal Foreign Office.29 The protection 
27 See Chapter 8, ‘Practice and Capacity Building in 
Central Asia’ in Marsden and Brandon, above n 15.
28 UNECE, ‘UNECE cooperates with Interstate 
Commission on Sustainable Development to strengthen 
implementation of Rio+20 outcomes in Central Asia,’ 
press release, 31 May 2013.
29 Ibid.
of the Aral Sea is a priority issue for the UNECE, 
as noted at a recent conference.30
Vulnerable ecosystems are also a key area of 
Afghan-Tajik cooperation on environment and 
hydrology in the upper Amu Darya Basin, which 
the Convention supports, where steps have been 
taken to establish data exchange and assess the 
status of ecosystems.31 In the Chu and Talas 
River Basins, a project supported by the Global 
Environmental Facility and UNECE will expand 
the cooperation of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
to water quality and biodiversity.32 In another 
example, this time in Caucasia, deterioration of 
water quality and degradation of ecosystems 
has brought Georgia and Azerbaijan together 
to develop a bilateral agreement on the shared 
water resources of the Kura River Basin as part 
of a joint UNECE-Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe project under the Envi-
ronment and Security Initiative.33
In eastern Asia as part of the preliminary 
assessment exercise,34 formal evaluations were 
completed by the Working Group on Monitor-
30 UNECE, ‘UNECE Executive Secretary participates in 
conference on sustainable development in the Aral Sea 
Basin’ press release, 29 October 2014.
31 UNECE, ‘UNECE supports Afghan-Tajik cooperation 
on environment and hydrology in the Amu Darya Basin,’ 
press release, 28 March 2013.
32 See UNECE, ‘UNECE fosters cooperation between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to address water issues’, 
press release, 2 June 2015; and Bo Libert, ‘The UNECE 
Water Convention and the Development of Trans-
boundary Cooperation in the Chu-Talas, Kura, Drin and 
 Dniester River Basins’ (2015) 40 Water International 168.
33 UNECE, ‘Water and Biodiversity: UNECE Water Con-
vention puts ecosystems at the heart of water manage-
ment’, press release, 22 May 2013.
34 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Economic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the 
Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, Working Group on Monitoring and Assessment, 
Eight meeting, Helsinki, 25–27 June 2007, Preliminary 
assessment of transboundary rivers discharging to Pacific 
Ocean and their major transboundary tributaries. ECE/
MP.WAT/WG.2/2007/14. (Preliminary Assessment).
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ing and Assessment for the Amur River Basin,35 
which is shared between China, Mongolia and 
Russia; and the Tumen River Basin, shared be-
tween China, North Korea and Russia.36 In rela-
tion to the latter, regulation of which overlaps 
to an extent with the Tumen Agreements (which 
include South Korea as a Party also),37 the assess-
ment comments: ‘The drawing up of a multilat-
eral agreement between China, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Fed-
eration is of utmost importance. It should provide 
for joint measures on monitoring and assessment 
… in order to decrease the overall human impact 
on the waters in the Tumen River basin.’38 
The Second Assessment of Transboundary 
Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters, was completed 
in 2011.39 Contributions were received from nu-
merous states, not only Parties to the Conven-
tion, but also UNECE members who are not 
Parties, and experts from countries outside the 
UNECE region who share waters with UNECE 
35 See Ariel Dinar, Shlomi Dinar, Stephen McCaffrey, 
and Daene McKinney, ‘Case Study 4: The Aral Sea Basin’ 
in Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation 
and Cooperation (World Scientific, 2013, second edition) 
339–362.
36 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Work-
ing Group on Integrated Water Resources Management, 
Sixth meeting Geneva, 4–5 May 2011; Working Group on 
Monitoring and Assessment, Twelfth meeting, Geneva, 
2–4 May 2011.
37 1995 Agreement on the Establishment of the Tumen 
River Area Development Coordination Committee, 
signed in New York, 6 December 1995, unreported; 1995 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Consultative 
Commission for the Development of the Tumen River 
Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, signed 
in New York, 6 December 1995, unreported. See Simon 
Marsden, ‘Developing Approaches to Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment in China: Cooperation 
through the Greater Tumen Initiative and in the Pearl 
River Delta Region’ (2010) 9 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 393.
38 Preliminary Assessment, above n 34, para 25, 7–8.
39 Second Assessment, above n 24.
states: Afghanistan, China, Iran and Mongolia. 
Part III contains the major findings, with the Cau-
casus the subject of chapter 4 and central Asia 
chapter 5; drainage basins of the Aral Sea and 
other transboundary waters in central Asia are 
considered in part IV, chapter 3. In part IV, the 
drainage basins of the White, Barents and Kara 
Seas are however examined in detail in chapter 1; 
the Sea of Othotsk and the Sea of Japan in chap-
ter 2;40 and the Caspian Sea in chapter 4.41 
As an example of some of the findings, part 
of the relevance of part IV chapter 1 is the Yenisey 
River, which flows entirely within Russian ter-
ritory, although the upper part of the basin is 
transboundary, as it includes parts of the Selenga 
River, shared with Mongolia.42 This also consists 
of the Selenga River, Lake Baikal and the Angara 
River, where heavy metals and petroleum prod-
ucts have impacted water quality, which in the 
Selenga is concluded to be ‘heavily polluted’.43 
40 This includes the shared basins of the Amur River 
(shared by China, Russia, and in small part, Mongolia); 
the Argun/Hailaer River (shared by the same states); the 
Ussuri/Wusuli River (shared by China and Russia); the 
Khanka/Xingkai Lake (China and Russia); the Sujfun/
Razdolnaya River (China and Russia); the Tumen/
Tumannaya River (China, Russia, North Korea). Second 
Assessment, above n 24, 99–106.
41 For a summary of the numerous transboundary 
watercourses and international lakes in this sub-region 
which cross nine riparian states, see Second Assessment, 
above n 24, 131.
42 Other shared basins include the Ob River (shared by 
China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia); the Irtysh/
Ertis (shared by Russia, Kazakhstan, and, with a very 
small part shared by China and Mongolia); the Tobol 
and Ishim/Esil sub-basins (shared between Russia and 
Kazakhstan). See Second Assessment, above n 24, 91–98.
43 Second Assessment, above n 24, 90. While it also con-
cludes that Lake Baikal serves as a natural barrier for 
the transboundary flow of pollutants, preventing their 
impact on the downstream part of the watercourse, it is 
however significantly impacted by mining activity and 
as such is being considered for inscription on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger under the World Heritage 
Convention. See: Convention Concerning the Protection 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for 
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The Russian-Mongolian Joint Commission on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Wa-
ters is however in existence, which operates on 
the basis of the intergovernmental 1995 Agree-
ment on the protection and use of transbound-
ary waters, meets regularly.44 To address current 
pressures, there are 19 surface water monitoring 
stations observing daily in the Selenga Basin in 
Mongolia. In the framework of the ‘Strengthen-
ing Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Mongolia’ project, 17 groundwater-monitoring 
wells are proposed to be established within the 
Selenga River Basin area.45
IV. Establishment of the Implementation 
Committee and compliance in Asia
A NCP was recently established, known as the 
Implementation Committee. While not required 
under the original Convention text, it was initi-
ated by the Legal Board at its seventh meeting 
based on experiences with the other UNECE 
treaties.46 The Chair of the Legal Board recom-
mended the body be of an ‘advisory, consultative 
and facilitative nature and as such would serve as 
a dispute prevention mechanism’.47 Participants 
from central Asia added that reporting could 
also serve as a benchmark for implementation.48 
It was accepted that non-state actors, especially 
signature 16 November 1972, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into 
force 17 December 1975).
44 The provisions of the Agreement include an exchange 
of information on transboundary waters.
45 Second Assessment, above n 24, 90, and note the other 
governance mechanisms in place.
46 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Seventh meeting Geneva, 15 and 16 April 2010; 
Report of the Legal Board on its Seventh Meeting, ECE/
MP.WA/AC.4/2010/2, para II, ‘Mechanism to facilitate 
and support implementation and compliance’.
47 Legal Board, above n 46, para II.9.
48 Legal Board, above n 46, para II.15.
the public, should have a role in bringing issues 
to the Implementation Committee.49 
Together with Meetings of the Parties and 
other arrangements, NCPs are an example of 
an ‘autonomous institutional arrangement’; 
they are however, no longer a ‘little-noticed 
phenomenon’.50 There is also an increasing trend 
towards the judicialisation of such procedures,51 
with a developing quasi-jurisprudence some-
times referred to as ‘case law’.52 This is especial-
ly so in connection with public communications 
heard by the Aarhus Convention53 Compliance 
Committee (ACCC), which frequently consid-
ers the link between environmental and human 
rights. The ACCC is the most advanced of these 
bodies in providing public access, with numer-
ous communications to date from individuals 
and NGOs. It is therefore perhaps not surpris-
ingly heralded as a precedent for other compa-
rable bodies, with recent consideration given to 
transplanting some aspects of the ACCC into a 
more complex global context. 54
At the eighth meeting of the Legal Board, 
discussions of the drafting group (established 
49 Legal Board, above n 46, para II.25.
50 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous In-
stitutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: a Little-Noticed Phenomenon in Interna-
tional Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 
623.
51 Neil Craik and Timo Koivurova, ‘Subsidiary Decision 
Making under the Espoo Convention: Legal Status and 
Legitimacy’ (2011) 20 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 258.
52 A Andrusevych, T Alge and C Konrad (eds) Case Law 
of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (2004–
2011), 2nd editon (RACSE, 2011).
53 Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998) 2161 
UNTS 447, in force on 30 October 2001.
54 Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, ‘Constitutionalising 
Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: 
Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement 
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2012) 24 
Journal of Environmental Law 103.
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to prepare the compliance procedure) were con-
sidered.55 A distinctive feature was an advisory 
procedure, emphasising assistance where there 
was a lack of deliberate non-compliance. A Party 
or Parties could therefore request advice from 
the Committee about efforts to attempt to secure 
compliance.56 It was not however proposed that 
the public directly make submissions, unlike un-
der the ACCC. In relation to follow-up measures 
these were confirmed to be facilitative rather 
than punitative, and ranging from assistance to 
requests for action plans and progress reports. 
More serious measures could only follow MOP 
decisions, such as statements of concern, declara-
tions of non-compliance, cautions or suspension 
of rights and privileges.57
The ninth meeting of the Legal Board en-
dorsed most of the previous recommendations, 
although referrals by the secretariat were con-
sidered unnecessary.58 The need for a formal re-
porting mechanism was also discussed and the 
need to separate this from the compliance proce-
dure.59 Such reporting mechanisms typically are 
55 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Eighth meeting Geneva, 24 and 25 February 2011. 
ECE/MP.WAT/AC.4/2011/2, para II.
56 Legal Board, above n 55, para II.13.
57 Legal Board, above n 55, para II.17. Note that perfor-
mance reviews of individual states are another means 
by which the UNECE evaluates treaty compliance, or 
 according to the UNECE is ‘an assessment of the progress 
a country has made in reconciling its environmental 
and economic targets and in meeting its international 
environmental commitments’; most of the central Asian 
and Caucasian states have been through two cycles of 
performance reviews; see http://www.unece.org/env/
epr.html
58 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Ninth meeting Geneva, 1 and 2 September 2011. 
ECE/MP.WAT/AC.4/2011/5, para II.10.
59 Legal Board, above n 58, para II.14.
based on the completion of questionnaires by the 
Parties which enable follow up by treaty bodies 
as appropriate; other information means, such 
as involvement of the public, often supplement 
such procedures. The tenth meeting approved 
the text of such a procedure and determined that 
the MOP would examine it further in November 
2012,60 when a draft decision was prepared for 
adoption.61 This was duly done, and the Imple-
mentation Committee commenced its work soon 
thereafter.62
The Implementation Committee has since 
held five meetings, with members serving in a 
personal capacity rather than as state representa-
tives. The first was in June 2013,63 and the agenda 
included discussion of lessons learnt from other 
implementation and compliance mechanisms. 
In addition to procedures under various multi-
lateral agreements these also included those es-
60 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Tenth meeting Geneva, 31 January and 1 February 
2012. ECE/MP.WAT/AC.4/2012/2, para II.9. Annex I con-
tains the text of the ‘Mechanism to support implemen-
tation and compliance’, and Annex II the ‘Core rules of 
procedure of the Implementation Committee’.
61 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Sixth 
session, Rome, 28–30 November 2012, Item 4(a) of the 
provisional agenda, Draft decision on support to imple-
mentation and compliance. ECE/MP.WAT/2012/L.4. 
62 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties to 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourses and International Lakes, Sixth session, 
Rome, 28–30 November 2012, Report of the Meeting of 
the Parties on its sixth session. ECE/MP.WAT/37, Ad.2, 
23 July 2013.
63 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, First meeting Geneva 5 June 2013. 
ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2013/2, para II.7.
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tablished under the Aarhus and Espoo Conven-
tions (and SEA Protocol64), and the Convention 
Water and Health Protocol.65 The relationship 
between compliance procedures and domes-
tic remedies, periodic reporting and compli-
ance procedures, the non-adversarial nature of 
the procedures, and the role of the secretariat, 
together with other issues, received particular 
 attention.66 
The first meeting discussed at length the 
need for a formal reporting mechanism.67 The 
work programme adopted at the 2012 MOP in-
cluded ‘Consideration of the need for reporting 
under the Convention’, to be led by the Conven-
tion Bureau as supported by the Secretariat. The 
Working Group on Integrated Water Resources 
Management in consultation with the Commit-
tee was tasked to analyse the need for a report-
ing mechanism.68 Concentrating on policy issues 
rather than data, such a reporting mechanism 
would therefore distinguish itself from related 
reporting procedures,69 which had caused con-
cern among certain Parties, and threatened the 
prospect of the establishment for other Parties, 
in particular those outside the European Union, 
such as in Asia. 
The second meeting of the Committee in 
December 2013 began by examining issues 
raised by an environmental NGO in relation to 
Kazakhstan, where concern was expressed re-
garding difficulties in transboundary water co-
operation in the Irtysh River Basin, shared by 
64 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to 
the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context (Kiev, 21 May 2003), 
unreported, in force 11 July 2010.
65 Protocol on Water and Health to the Convention on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and Lakes (London, 17 June 1999), UNTS 2331, 202, in 
force 4 August 2005.
66 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.8
67 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.13
68 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.13.
69 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.15.
Russia, Kazakhstan, China and Mongolia, and 
the situation in the Ili River Basin, shared by Chi-
na and Kazakhstan. Among other matters, it also 
exchanged views on the possibility of detailing 
general criteria or factors to guide the determi-
nation of when a Committee initiative might be 
started, and how best to publicise the availability 
of the new compliance procedure.70 
The third meeting of the Committee took 
place in May 2014, and discussed further the 
matter in relation to Kazakhstan, as well as dis-
cussion about reporting requirements under the 
Helsinki Convention, and raising awareness of 
the NCP mechanism to facilitate and support 
implementation and compliance.71 In relation to 
reporting, the Committee noted that it ‘should 
be on the implementation of Parties’ cooperation 
obligations’, it ‘should be thematic (issue-based)’, 
and that it ‘should take into account other inter-
national or regional reporting obligations with a 
view to avoiding duplication of effort’.72
The fourth meeting was held in December 
2014 and the Committee noted that Kazakhstan 
and Russia had yet to respond substantively to 
the questions posed by it in connection with the 
70 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, Second meeting Geneva 12 De-
cember 2013. ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2013/4, 13 January 2014, 
paras II and IV.
71 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, Third meeting Bologna 15 May 
2014. ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2014/2, 18 June 2014, paras III, 
IV and V.
72 Implementation Committee, above n 71, para IV.12–14. 
See Economic Commission for Europe / Environment, 
Informal Network of the Chairs of compliance / imple-
mentation bodies under the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, Third Meeting, Geneva, 29 June 2015, ‘Note 
prepared by the Chair of the Aarhus Convention Compli-
ance Committee with the assistance of the secretariat’.
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implementation of the principles of reasonable 
and equitable use and the ‘no harm’ rule. While it 
was grateful for the general information provid-
ed by them, it observed that ‘cooperation per se 
was not the overall objective of the Convention.’73 
There was therefore a need for them to provide 
more comprehensive information on the Irtysh 
River Basin in relation to the development activ-
ity in the upstream part of the basin. 
The fifth meeting was held in May 2015, 
and further discussed the situation in the Irtysh 
River Basin, deciding to gather information from 
other sources than the Parties.74 The Committee 
also decided to approach Kazakhstan and Russia 
again for the information requested in earlier cor-
respondence, and to explain to them that a Com-
mittee initiative may well be considered neces-
sary to advance the process.75 Among the usual 
business of considering any requests of advice, 
submissions, Committee initiatives and informa-
tion gathering, Committee members were invit-
ed to share information about future possibilities 
to promote the mechanism to facilitate and sup-
port implementation and compliance, including 
an international water law event for the benefit of 
central Asian states in May 2016.76 Two members 
of the Committee also reported on results of the 
meetings held by the Core Group on Reporting 
73 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Econom-
ic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties to the 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, Implementation 
Committee, Fourth meeting London 4 December 2014. 
ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2014/4, 20 January 2015, para III, 7.
74 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, Fifth meeting Vienna, 5–6 May 
2015. ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2015/2, 27 May 2015, Report 
of the Implementation Committee on its fifth meeting, 
para III.6.
75 Implementation Committee, above n 74, paras III. 7 
and 8.
76 Implementation Committee, above n 74, para IV.10.
held between December 2014 and March 2015, 
which was mandated to prepare a proposal for a 
reporting mechanism under the Convention; this 
was supported by the Committee.77 
It should be emphasised that the lack of an 
explicit legal basis for the NCP in the Convention 
text is not uncommon, and is consistent with the 
dispute avoidance objective of NCPs generally; 
a legal basis for such a provision would be dif-
ficult to support for many states. As suggested, 
the strongest NCP found in any of the UNECE 
treaties is the ACCC. In accordance with Article 
15 of the Aarhus Convention,78 the MOP is there-
fore required to establish ‘optional arrangements 
of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and con-
sultative nature for reviewing compliance with 
the provisions of the Convention’. At its first 
session in October 2002, the Aarhus MOP adopt-
ed decision I/7 on review of compliance,79 and 
elected the first Committee which has since been 
highly effective in its work.80 Whether the Hel-
sinki Convention Committee is able to operate 
as  effectively, given the high political sensitiv-
ity surrounding transboundary water issues, re-
mains to be seen. What is important is that any 
NCP is supported by a formal reporting proce-
dure; while reporting was not originally foreseen 
in the Convention’s text, current discussion on 
the possible introduction of a reporting mecha-
nism shows that the Convention is evolving to 
meet emerging needs.
77 Implementation Committee, above n 74, paras IV.11 
and 12.
78 See Aarhus Convention, above n 53. This is largely 
because of the possibility of public submissions. Note 
the Compliance Committee under the Protocol on Water 
and Health. The Compliance Committee noted at its 
meeting held in Geneva on 25 November 2014, that the 
first communication it had received was from a member 
of the public. See Implementation Committee, above 
n 73, para V.13.
79 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/docu-
ments/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf
80 See Cardesa-Salzmann, above n 54.
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V. Conclusions
The Helsinki Convention is well established in 
the UNECE region, and is now playing a major 
role in bringing states in the Caucasus, central, 
northern and eastern Asia together to resolve 
potential disagreements over water resources; 
other Asian states have also expressed an inter-
est in joining. The global opening of the Con-
vention has enhanced interest generally, and 
will assist further in capacity building efforts 
to develop implementation and compliance ef-
forts in Asia; these are likely to extend to south-
ern and western Asia as experience grows. The 
provisions of the Convention are advanced in 
providing both a framework and requiring fur-
ther detailed agreement between Parties; sig-
nificantly also, in mandating the establishment 
of joint bodies to, among other things, evaluate 
proposals with potential to impact detrimen-
tally on transboundary watercourses. The Con-
vention is  furthermore aided by the broader 
transboundary environmental governance of 
the UNECE and its related treaties on environ-
mental impact assessment, public participation 
and industrial accidents, which add value to its 
operation.
In relation to implementation and compli-
ance, the Implementation Committee is leading 
this challenging task as the Committee work 
develops. This has already targeted instances 
where there is the potential for non-compliance 
by individual Parties, and it has contributed 
significantly to capacity building efforts more 
broadly. The relationship between compliance 
and reporting is also receiving increased atten-
tion, and benefits from the clustering of the en-
vironmental agreements that the UNECE has 
produced. Experiences learned in relation to the 
other treaties and protocols are therefore free-
ly shared, and the fact that states are typically 
Party to one or more of these agreements means 
that they are familiar with the procedures that 
are contained within them. Ensuring domestic 
implementation and adherence to these proce-
dural obligations is ultimately the responsibility 
of treaty bodies, Parties, the public and others in 
tandem. Yet assisting states to comply with these 
obligations, where there is either a deliberate fail-
ure or lack of capacity, is a very important role of 
the Implementation Committee. In Asia, where 
states have frequently avoided confrontation or 
legal challenge,81 it is all the more important. 
81 See Simon Chesterman, ‘The International Court of 
Justice in Asia: Interpreting the Temple of Preah Vihear 
Case’ (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law 1, who 
finds that, where Asian states do pursue international 
litigation, they have a clear preference for bilateral settle-
ment of disputes.
